Rate My Professor Eric Maskin

Maskin's research focuses on mechanism design, implementation theory, game theory, contract theory, auctions, social choice, incomplete contracts, repeated games, environmental economics, inequality, and elections. He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2007, jointly with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. Additional honors include Fellow of the Econometric Society (1981), Guggenheim Fellowship (1980-1981), Sloan Research Fellowship (1983-1985), Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1994), Member of the National Academy of Sciences (2008), and over a dozen honorary doctorates, such as Doctor of Science from the University of Cambridge (2017). Key publications include 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality' (Review of Economic Studies, 1999), 'Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts' with Jean Tirole (Review of Economic Studies, 1999), 'The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information' with Drew Fudenberg (Econometrica, 1986), and 'Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buyers' with John Riley (Econometrica, 1984). His contributions have significantly shaped modern economic theory on incentives, institutions, and strategic behavior.