Eric Maskin

Eric S. Maskin is the Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics at Harvard University. He received his A.B. in Mathematics from Harvard University in 1972, A.M. in Applied Mathematics in 1974, and Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics in 1976. After completing his doctorate, he was a Research Fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge University from 1976 to 1977. His distinguished career includes serving as Assistant Professor (1977-1980), Associate Professor (1980-1981), and Professor of Economics (1981-1984) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor of Economics at Harvard University from 1985 to 2000 and since 2012; Louis Berkman Professor of Economics at Harvard from 1997 to 2000; and Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study from 2000 to 2011. In 2016, he was appointed Professor of Mathematics at Harvard and has been Adams University Professor since 2012. Maskin has held numerous visiting positions, including Overseas Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge (1980-1982), and Hagler Fellow at Texas A&M University (2023-2026).

Maskin's research focuses on mechanism design, implementation theory, game theory, contract theory, auctions, social choice, incomplete contracts, repeated games, environmental economics, inequality, and elections. He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2007, jointly with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. Additional honors include Fellow of the Econometric Society (1981), Guggenheim Fellowship (1980-1981), Sloan Research Fellowship (1983-1985), Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1994), Member of the National Academy of Sciences (2008), and over a dozen honorary doctorates, such as Doctor of Science from the University of Cambridge (2017). Key publications include 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality' (Review of Economic Studies, 1999), 'Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts' with Jean Tirole (Review of Economic Studies, 1999), 'The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information' with Drew Fudenberg (Econometrica, 1986), and 'Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buyers' with John Riley (Econometrica, 1984). His contributions have significantly shaped modern economic theory on incentives, institutions, and strategic behavior.

Professional Email: emaskin@fas.harvard.edu