Alvin Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University in the Business & Economics faculty and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. He also holds the position of George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University. Roth's distinguished career began at the University of Illinois in 1974 as Assistant Professor in the Departments of Business Administration and Economics, where he advanced to Associate Professor in 1977 and Full Professor in 1979, remaining until 1982. He then served as A.W. Mellon Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982 to 1998, followed by his tenure at Harvard University from 1998 to 2012, before joining Stanford in 2013. His academic background includes a B.S. in Operations Research from Columbia University in 1971, an M.S. in Operations Research from Stanford University in 1973, and a Ph.D. in Operations Research from Stanford University in 1974.

Roth's research specializations encompass game theory, experimental economics, and market design, areas for which he shared the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Lloyd Shapley “for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.” He is a Member of the National Academy of Sciences since 2013, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1998, Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1983, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science since 2012, recipient of the Lanchester Prize in 1990, Guggenheim Fellow from 1983 to 1984, and holder of numerous honorary doctorates including from the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in 2013 and Lund University in 2014. Key publications include the book "Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis" with Marilda Sotomayor (Cambridge University Press, 1990); "Handbook of Experimental Economics" edited with John H. Kagel (Princeton University Press, 1995); "The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design" with Elliott Peranson (American Economic Review, 1999); "Kidney exchange" with Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004); and "Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology fellowship market" with Muriel Niederle (Journal of Political Economy, 2003). Roth's innovations have revolutionized market designs for the National Resident Matching Program, kidney paired exchanges, and school choice systems such as Boston Public Schools, exerting profound influence on economics and practical applications. He has delivered public lectures on market design for organs, physicians, and education and edited volumes on experimental economics.

Professional Email: alroth@stanford.edu