Rate My Professor Anthony Kwasnica

Kwasnica earned his Ph.D. and M.S. in Social Science from the California Institute of Technology in 2000 and 1997, respectively, and his B.A. in Economics from the University of Arizona in 1994. His research specializations are experimental economics and game theory, with a focus on the role of private information in economic systems. He conducts theoretical and laboratory research on auction design, coordination in games, conservation auctions, and decision-making under information uncertainty. His experiments have informed policy, including designs for Federal Communications Commission broadband spectrum auctions, analyses of cable television industry concentration, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency projects on prediction markets for global instability. Notable publications include 'Coordination in the Presence of Asset Markets' (American Economic Review, 2011, with S. Kogan and R. Weber), 'Should Sellers Prefer Auctions? A Laboratory Comparison of Auctions and Sequential Mechanisms' (Management Science, 2014, with A. Davis and E. Katok), 'A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions' (Management Science, 2005, with C. DeMartini, J. Ledyard, and D. Porter), and 'Collusion and Equilibrium Selection in Auctions' (The Economic Journal, 2007, with K. Sherstyuk). Kwasnica has been Co-Editor of Economic Inquiry since 2010 and co-edited a special issue of Interfaces on experimental economics applications.