At a glance
French jurist Amara Kone shows how the ICJ's framing of a dispute's object shapes emergency rulings, and dissects US human rights treaty tensions.
The most consequential rulings the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hands down are often the ones it produces in weeks, not years. When a state asks the Court for provisional measures — emergency orders meant to preserve each side's rights before irreparable harm sets in — the judges in The Hague must decide quickly whether they can even hear the case, let alone how it should end.
For Amara Kone, a public law scholar at the Institut Catholique de Paris, that rushed moment hides a structural question most observers skip: what exactly is the dispute about? Her 2022 article in the Canadian Yearbook of International Law argues that the Court's answer shapes its jurisdiction ratione materiae, the authority to rule on this specific subject matter rather than some other legal question. The two determinations, she shows, feed into each other.
That matters more than it used to. The Court's emergency docket has carried requests over Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, South Africa's genocide allegations against Israel, and the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Whether judges act, and how far their orders reach, turns on that early contest over framing. Kone's doctoral thesis, defended in 2020 at the Université d'Orléans, exposes a parallel tension inside the United States: a country that treats its own rights record as sufficient while binding itself only loosely to the international treaties it helped design.
A legal turnstile with two moving parts
Provisional measures come from Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. They are provisional in a precise sense: they aim to protect each party's rights pending the final decision, not to resolve the case. A classic example is an order telling a state to halt a military operation while the Court considers whether that operation breaches a treaty. Before issuing one, the Court does not need to establish its jurisdiction in full. It needs a prima facie basis, an appearance at first sight that a valid ground of jurisdiction exists.
Jurisdiction ratione materiae is the subject-matter half of that inquiry. It asks whether the fight falls inside the box of topics a treaty lets the Court decide. The box is usually drawn by a compromissory clause, a provision in which states agree in advance that disputes over a treaty's interpretation, application, or fulfilment may be brought to the Court. Article 36(1) of the Statute funnels those clauses into the Court's authority.
Think of a museum ticket that grants entry to a single exhibition. The compromissory clause is the ticket; the object of the dispute is the room the visitor insists on entering. If the case is really about another exhibition, the ticket does not work. Kone's contribution is to show that, at the provisional measures stage, the visitor and the guard are still arguing over what the ticket covers, and the Court's reading of that ticket determines which doors open.
Why the object of the dispute is a two-way street
Kone's central finding is that the influence runs in both directions. On one side, the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction rests on the object of the dispute, because a compromissory clause only covers disagreements about that treaty. On the other side, the jurisdiction the Court claims shapes how it characterises the object of the dispute. A state that files under a genocide convention, for example, is asking the Court to see an entire conflict through that one legal lens.
The article, written in French, traces this interplay through recent cases. In Qatar v United Arab Emirates, the Court examined whether the dispute concerned the interpretation or application of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In Iran v United States, the question was whether the claims fell within the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the two states. In each instance, deciding what the case was about was inseparable from deciding whether the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction at all. The full article is available from Cambridge University Press.
“The object of the dispute and the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction are not separate questions,” she writes. “Each conditions the other, which makes them key notions in provisional measures litigation before the Court.”
The non-aggravation puzzle
The article's second thread concerns a doctrinal sore spot. The Court has read Article 41(1) as allowing it to indicate measures to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute. Kone notes that such non-aggravation measures can sit uneasily with the standard logic that provisional measures protect only the rights actually in dispute. She describes a possible decoupling from the object of the dispute and from the function of provisional measures themselves.
Her argument is not that these measures are illegitimate. She suggests they may, in a certain way, serve the purposes and principles of the United Nations, particularly the maintenance of international peace and security. The meaning and scope of that power, she writes, raise serious questions.
“A measure that stops a conflict from worsening is politically attractive, but its legal basis is thinner than it looks,” said an independent expert on the Court's procedure who was not involved in the research. “The moment provisional measures drift from protecting the rights in dispute toward general peacekeeping, litigants lose a predictable way to anticipate what the Court will order.”
The American discourse: sufficient at home, selective abroad
Kone's thesis moves from The Hague to Washington. Defended in October 2020 under the supervision of Nicolas Haupais at the Université d'Orléans, it examines what she calls a double tension in the American discourse of international human rights protection.
- The United States presents its domestic legal order as already saturated with human rights norms, so much so that it can engage broadly in implementing international rules. Yet even a survey of the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the federal Constitution, reveals gaps, including in the civil and political rights to which the federation is viscerally attached.
- International law is nonetheless a permanent stake in American discourse, as the Constitution's Offenses Clause and its Supremacy Clause on treaties show. But American engagement with customary international law, and with the multilateral human rights treaties to which the United States is a party, is not free of criticism.
The Offenses Clause, in Article I of the Constitution, lets Congress define and punish offences against the law of nations. The Supremacy Clause, in Article VI, makes ratified treaties part of the supreme law of the land. Both suggest international law should matter deeply to American constitutional practice. Kone's thesis argues that, in practice, the American reading of human rights protection looks less like a product of the United Nations Charter and the international human rights law derived from it than like a product of preserving the national interest of the United States.
The treaty record reinforces the point. Washington has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, each with reservations and understandings attached. The covenants and conventions on economic and social rights, women's rights, children's rights, and disability rights remain signed but unratified. The thesis is catalogued at theses.fr.
Where the two studies meet
Read side by side, the two projects are about the same thing: the distance between what a state says and what binding international law requires. In the ICJ article, the object of the dispute is the mechanism through which consent and framing meet. In the thesis, discourse is the mechanism through which a powerful state manages the reach of the treaties it accepts.
The connection is not incidental. The Court confirmed in the LaGrand case of 2001 that its provisional measures are legally binding, a development Kone's article places at the centre of the field's renewed relevance. A state that characterises a dispute narrowly, or that enters treaties with broad reservations, is doing in two different arenas what she describes in one: controlling the scope of international legal obligation before it can bite. Her research profile at the Université d'Orléans lists public international law and international human rights law among her core themes.
What the work does not claim
Both pieces are doctrinal and qualitative. The ICJ article works from case law rather than data, and it deliberately sets aside purely consensual routes to jurisdiction, such as special agreements between states and the forum prorogatum technique, in which a respondent accepts the Court's jurisdiction after the case is filed. Its conclusions concern the structure of the Court's reasoning, not a statistical claim about outcomes.
The thesis is a study of legal discourse. Its finding that American human rights policy is shaped by the preservation of national interest is an interpretation of constitutional text and treaty practice, not a measurement of policymakers' private intentions.
Some practitioners would push back on both fronts. A litigator might note that provisional measures orders are explicitly provisional and do not prejudge jurisdiction, so the early framing question matters less than it appears; the real test arrives later, at the preliminary objections stage. A defender of the Court's non-aggravation measures might call them pragmatic rather than doctrinally loose, a way to keep a bad situation from spiralling while the lawyers argue.
The next decade of emergency litigation
Whatever the criticism, the emergency docket is unlikely to shrink. Climate obligations and armed conflicts are pushing more states toward the Court, and cross-border cyber operations are joining the docket too. Almost every high-stakes case now begins with a request for provisional measures.
That makes the opening fight, over what the dispute is about, more consequential than the ones that follow. Kone's work gives litigating states and judges a clearer map of that contest, and a sharper warning about how much rides on it.
Photo by Sasun Bughdaryan on Unsplash
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