Rate My Professor Michal Feldman

Feldman's research lies at the intersection of computer science, game theory, and economics, focusing on the design and analysis of algorithms for auctions, markets, contracts, and networks under uncertainty, with emphasis on efficiency, simplicity, robustness, and fairness. His influential early works include 'Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks' (2004, 836 citations), 'Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems' (2004, 733 citations), 'Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems' (2005, 414 citations), and 'Incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer networks' (2003, 373 citations). Recent contributions encompass combinatorial contract design, prophet inequalities, and interdependent valuations, featured in top venues such as Econometrica ('Ambiguous Contracts', 2024), Mathematics of Operations Research, and ACM EC. He co-authored book chapters 'Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems' in Algorithmic Game Theory and 'Secretaries, Prophets and Applications to Matching' in Online and Matching-Based Market Design (2023). Feldman has garnered major awards including ACM Fellow (2024), Weizmann Prize (2025), AAIA Fellow (2025), ERC grant (2023), ACM SIGecom Mid-Career Award (2023), ISF Breakthrough (MAPATZ) (2024), Rector's Teaching Award (2024), Bruno Award (2022), and Kadar Award (2022). He chairs ACM Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation (SIGecom) and is an invited speaker at the International Congress of Mathematics (2026).